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IQBAL, PROCEDURAL MISMATCHES, AND
CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION
by
Howard M. Wasserman
Understanding the twin pleading cases of Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twomnbly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal from the vantage point of only a few
months (or even years) requires as much prediction as explanation. Early
confusion is a product of the long-heralded link between substance and
procedure. What we are seeing now may be less about Court-imposed
changes to procedure as about changes to substantive law and a
"mismatch" between new substance and the old procedure of the Federal
Rules. Much of the current business of federal courts involves
constitutional litigation under 42 U.S. C. §S1983 and Bivens, a species
of civil action unheard of when the Federal Rules and the system of
notice pleadingand broad, wide-ranging discovery were created in 1938.
That pleading system arguably does not work with such "modern"
litigation and Iqbal reflects the Court's effort to make federal pleading
and discovery rules more consistent and more functional with this
particularly vulnerable area of new federal substance. Unfortunately, the
greater detail demanded by the new pleading rules may be impossible in
many civil rights cases, where plaintiffs cannot know or plead essential
information with particularity at the outset without the benefit of
discovery-discovery that Iqbal stands to deny to plaintffs who fail to
plead with the necessary detail. The predictable result, illustrated by one
Ninth Circuit decision just two months after Iqbal, will be a significant
decrease in enforcement and vindication of federal constitutional and
civil rights.
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INTRODUCTION

Understanding the twin pleading cases of Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly' and Ashcroft v. Iqbal from the vantage point of only a few

months (or even years) requires as much prediction as explanation. We
just do not know much right now. Most commentators are not
encouraged. At least some members of Congress seem eager to become
involved. Assuming no legislative intervention, early developments
under the new regime offer some hints as to where pleading doctrine is
and where it is going.
By its terms, Iqbal creates a two-step analysis for evaluating the
sufficiency of a complaint in deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule
12(b) (6). First, the court may disregard all conclusory or bald allegations,
declining to afford such allegations a presumption of truth.5 This is so
even for allegations for which the plaintiff could not know or add further
detail at the outset and without a chance for discovery. Second, the court
examines the remaining allegations, according them a presumption of
truth, to determine whether the allegations are plausible and whether
they plausibly suggest a violation of the application of substantive rights.
In determining plausibility, courts seem free to impose their own views of
what facts are plausible and what conclusions are plausible (or most

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007).
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, PlausibilityPleading Revisited and Revised: A Comment on
Ashcroft v. lqbal, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REv. (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 39),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1467799; Joseph A. Seiner, The Trouble with
Twombly: A ProposedPleading Standardfor Employment DiscriminationCases, 2009 U. ILL.
L. REv. 1011, 1014 (2009); A. Benjamin Spencer, UnderstandingPleadingDoctrine, 108
MICH. L. REv. 1, 6-7 (2009) [hereinafter Spencer, Understanding Pleading]; A.
Benjamin Spencer, PleadingCivil Rights Claims in the Post-Conley Era, 52 How. L.J. 99,
103 (2008) [hereinafter Spencer, Civil Rights]; Adam N. Steinman, The Pleading
Problem, 62 STAN. L. REv. (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 3), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1442786; Symposium, Pondering Iqbal, 14 LEWIS & CLARK
L. REv. 1 (2010); but see Richard A. Epstein, Bell Atlantic v. Twombly: How Motions to
Dismiss Become (Disguised) Summary Judgments, 25 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 61, 62, 98
(2007).
See, e.g., Open Access to Courts Act of 2009, H.R. 4115, 111th Cong. (2009);
Notice Pleading Restoration Act of 2009, S. 1504, 111th Cong. (2009); see also Has the
Supreme Court Limited Americans' Access to Courts?: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the

Judiciary, 111th Cong. (2009) [hereinafter Limited Court Access].
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949-50; Bone, supra note 3 (manuscript at 9-10); Steinman,
supra note 3 (manuscript at 24).
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950; Bone, supra note 3 (manuscript at 27, 33); Epstein,
supra note 3, at 70-71; Lonny S. Hoffman, Burn Up the Chaff with UnquenchableFire:
What Two DoctrinalIntersections Can Teach Us About JudicialPower Over Pleadings,88 B.U.
L. REV. 1217, 1262 (2008); Steinman, supra note 3 (manuscript at 64).
' Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950; Bone, supra note 3 (manuscript at 9-10); Steinman,
supranote 3 (manuscript at 24).
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plausible) from the facts pled . At bottom, Iqbal is about increased
judicial discretion to inquire into and parse the details of complaints,
almost certainly producing more 12(b) (6) dismissals, as well as wide
variance from case to case, even within the same court.9 And Iqbal and
Twombly together inextricably link pleading and discovery-the
motivation for the apparent move to strengthen pleading as a threshold
hurdle was the perceived need to protect defendants from wide-ranging,
expensive, burdensome, and distracting discovery. 10
The uncertain state of pleading demonstrates anew the longheralded link between substance and procedure." What we are seeing
now may be less about changes to procedure than about changes to
substantive law and what Thomas Main describes as a "mismatch"
between substance and procedure.12 In the face of a mismatch, either
suhstance or procedure must evolve to keep them from undermining one
another. Iqbal reflects an effort by the Court to make federal pleading
and discovery rules function in one particularly vulnerable area of federal
substance-constitutional litigation against federal officials. Arguably,
however, that effort will have the opposite substantive effect.
The paradigm of federal litigation when the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure took effect in 1938 was diversity-jurisdiction tort, contract,
debt, and other business disputes, as well as patent claims.' 3 The litigation
regime established by the Rules and Conley v. Gibson 4 -skeletal, limiteddetail "notice" pleading and broad wide-ranging, 5party-controlled,
cooperative factual discovery viewed as systemic benefits' -made sense in
these relatively straightforward, single-occurrence, few-party cases.
8Iqbal,
129 S. Ct. at 1950; Bone, supra note 3 (manuscript at 23); Stephen B.
Burbank, Pleading and the Dilemmas of Modern American Procedure, 93 JUDICATURE 109,

115, 118 (2009).
'Compare Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 965 (9th Cir. 2009) (reversing
denial of motion to dismiss) with al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 F.3d 949, 952 (9th Cir.
2009) (affirming denial of motion to dismiss in claim by detainee against former
attorney general); and Padilla v. Yoo, 633 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1011 (N.D. Cal. 2009)
(deng dismissal in claim against former Office of Legal Counsel attorney).
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1953-54; Bell Atd. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 196567 (2007); Bone, supra note 3 (manuscript at 11); Burbank, supra note 8, at 117;
Hoffman, supra note 6, at 1231.

11See Thomas 0. Main, The ProceduralFoundation of Substantive Law,

87 WASH. U.

L. Rrv. (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 17-18), available at http://ssm.com/
abstract-i 13916.
12 Id. (manuscript at 27-28); see also Epstein, supra note 3, at 66-67.
"3 Robert G. Bone, Twombly, PleadingRules, and the Regulation of Court Access, 94
IowA L. REv.

873, 896 (2009); Epstein, supra note 3, at 62; Judith Resnik, FailingFaith:

Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 494, 508 (1986); Howard M.
Wasserman, Civil Rights Plaintiffs and John Doe Defendants: A Study in Section 1983
Procedure, 25 CARDozo L. REv. 793, 802 (2003).
'~355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957).
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947); Epstein, supra note 3, at 69-70;
Richard L. Marcus, The Story of Hickman: Preserving Adversarial Incentives While

Embracing Broad Discovery,
Clermont ed., 2d ed. 2008).

in CIVIL PROCEDURE STORIEs

323, 323-24

(Kevin

M.
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Modern civil rights litigation (along with modem antitrust, securities,
and other complex litigation) was unheard of in 1938; this is substantive
law created and developed-in Congress, the courts, or both-only in
the past fifty years anid well after initroduction of the Federal Rules. But
these cases now form a substantial portion of federal civil litigation.' It is

no accident that the Supreme Court formally (if not forthrigh ty 1 7 )
changed direction first in a complex antitrust class action"' and followed
quickly in a Bivens action1 9 against high-level policymaking federal
officers (the former Attorney General of the United States, John
Ashcroft, and former Director of the FBI, William Mueller) asserting a
defense of qualified immunity.20 This is the new paradigmatic federal
substance, mismatched with old procedure; the new judicially imposed
stricter pleading was designed to correct this precise mismatch.
Civil rights claims possess five important traits distinguishing them
from the original federal-litigation paradigm . 2 ' These differences
arguably support Richard Epstein's argument that the 1938 litigation
2
model is "not well suited to the complexities of modem litigation. 1
Discovery becomes a defect in the system in these cases-too broad, too
costly, too burdensome, and too distracting, especially for high-ranking
government defendants expected to carry out the business of governing
and protecting the public well-being. 23 Discovery thus should be reser-ved
only for those cases that appear, at first glance, to have some merit.
Pleading provides that initial measure of merit-it performs a
meaningful weeding-out point, in which only claims appearing from the
outset to have merit should pass into discovery and the chance to really
learn what happened. Epstein praises Twombly for bringing procedure
into line with new substantive realities.
Civil rights is one substantive area in which Iqbal will empower courts
to increase scrutiny over pleadings, a prediction already bearing out in
the early days of the new pleading regime. And we can expect a

"JAMES C. DuFF, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2008 ANNUAL REPORT Or THE

143-45 tbl. C-2 (2009), available at http://www.uscou.-ts.gov/judbus2008/
judicial Busi nespdfversion.pdf.
DIRECTOR

"Bell Atd. Corp.

v. Twoxnbly,

127 S. Ct. 1955, 1974 (2007) ("[W]le do not require

heightened fact pleading of specifics . . .
Id. at 1961.
1See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388 (1971).
20 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1942-43 (2009) (citing Bivens, 403 U.S. 388).
21 infra Part Il.B.
22 Epstein, supra note 3, at 66.
2' Epstein, supra note 3, at 70-71; Marcus, supra note 15, at 355; see also Iqbal, 129
S. Ct. at 1953; Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1967.
2' Epstein, scupra note 3, at 98.
25 Bone, supra note 13, at 932; Bone, supra note 3 (manuscript at 33); Seiner,
supra note 3, at 1014; Spencer, Civil ffights, supra note 3, at 103; see also Patricia W.
Hatamyar, The Tao of Pleading: Do Twombly and Iqbal Matter Empirically?, Am. U. L.
REv. (forthcoming), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1487 7 6 4 ; Kendall W.
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continued willingness among courts in civil rights and constitutional
cases to wield their new discretion to dig into the details of complaints, to
parse the complaint as a whole and particular allegations within it, to
disregard insufficiently detailed allegations, and to decide what
allegations and conclusions are most plausible; all of which makes
pleading a significant veto-gate through which all claims must pass before
the opportunity for discovery, with its attendant costs, burdens, and
distractions, opens. 2
The predictable result will be a significant decrease in enforcement
and vindication of federal constitutional and civil rights, and of the
values and principles underlying those rights. But that decrease comes
not from changes to substantive constitutional law and not necessarily
from evidence of events on the ground demonstrating that no violation
occurred. Rather, it comes from altering procedure, imposing on
plaintiffs an obligation to present substantial factual detail at the outset
of litigation, even detail they do not and cannot know without discovery,
and empowering courts to form their own conclusions based on their
interpretations of factual allegations.
This Essay considers the evolution of substantive federal law (of
which the rise of civil rights litigation is a significant part) and how that
evolution produces (or is perceived as producing) substance-procedure
mismatches, requiring the current shift in procedural rules. This
evolution, more than any conscious consideration of an overall
procedural framework, explains the new (or affirmed) pleading-anddiscovery regime of Twombly and Iqbal. This Essay then examines Moss v.
US. Secret Service' 27 decided in the Ninth Circuit just two months after
Iqbal, as illustrating how lower courts may wield this new pleading regime
in civil rights cases and as predicting the future of civil rights pleading.
I1. SUBSTANTIVE EVOLUTION AND SUBSTANCEPROCEDURE MISMATCHES
A.

ProceduralMismatches

The substance-procedure link cuts in two directions. On one hand,
procedure is inherently substantive. Procedure and substance are
inseparable-procedural rules affect litigation behavior, create winners
and losers, and affect substantive outcomes and the overall enforcement
281
of substantive rights and policies. Changes to procedural rules, such as
heightened pleading, become problematic precisely because they

Hannon, Note, Much Ado About Twombly? A Study on the Impact of Bell Atlantic Corp.

v. Twombly on 12(b)(6) Motions, 83

NomE DAME L. Rr~v.

1811, 1836-37 (2008) (finding

a "pronounced change" in the rate of dismissals of civil rights claims under Twombly).
'6 Infra Part II.B.
27 572 F.3d 962 (9th Cir. 2009).
28 Main, supra note I11 (manuscript at 17-18, 21).
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undermine plaintiffs' ability to vindicate substantive rights . 29
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Civil

rights

claims uniquely demonstrate this link, being the consistent substantive
target of procedural law; past procedural reform efforts have been
criticized for their disparate negative impact on this "disfavored" class of
federal litigation:. Many commentators expect civil rights claims to be a
particular target of the new pleading regime.2
On the other hand, Thomas Main recently demonstrated that the
converse of the substance-procedure link also is true: "the construction of
substantive law necessarily entails making assumptions about how that law
ultimately will be enforced" in the existing procedural regime. 2
Procedure is not only necessary to effectuate substantive law; procedure
is an underlying assumption for which substantive rule-makers account
(or should account) in creating substantive law.22 Whether procedure
undermines or reinforces substance depends on the procedural
assumptions made in enacting that substance. As Main argues: "a
heightened pleading standard for civil rights cases does not undermine
substantive law that was drafted in anticipation of a heightened pleading
standard. Indeed, to apply a liberal pleading standard to that law instead
could lead to over-enforcement of the substantive mandate. 3 4 The risk is
what Main calls a "mismatch scenario" between substance and procedure,
in which failure to account for procedure in creating substance yields the
costly consequence of either over- or under-enforcement of substantive
2

rights. 35
Putting Main's insight into operation turns on several underlying
concerns. First, much depends on the source of the applicable
substantive and procedural rules-whether legislatively enacted,
judicially interpreted and construed, or judicially created in the first
instance. The risk of a mismatch arguably decreases where the same rulemaker defines both substance and procedure;3 it increases as different

2Bone,
supra note 13, at 913; see also Main, supra note 11 (manuscript at 20)
["P] rocedural reforms can have the effect of denying substantive rights without the
transparency, safeguards and accountability that attend public and legislative
dlecision-making."); id. (manuscript at 18-19) (identifying procedural devices whose
substantive effects have been analyzed).
"~ Burbank, supra note 8, at 117-18; Robert L. Carter, The FederalRules of Civil
Procedure as a Vindicator of Civil Rights, 137 U. PA. L. Riv. 2179, 2182 (1989); Richard L.
Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the FederalRules of Civil Procedure, 86 COLUM.
L. REN7. 433, 471 (1986); Spencer, Civil Rights, supra note 3, at 159; Wasserman, supra
note 13, at 804.
31See .supranote 25.
32Main, supra note 11I (manuscript at 2).

1Id.
3Id.

(manuscript at 20-21).
(manuscript at 28).

3Id. (manuscript at 27-29); see Bone, supra note 13, at 876; Bone, supra note 3
(manuscript at 33); Epstein, supra note 3, at 98 ("Some calibration of the scales of
error is needed ...
'6 Cf. Karen Nelson Moore, The Supreme Court's Role in Inter~preting the FederalRules
of Civil Procedure, 44 HASTINGs L.J. 1039, 1040 (1993) (arguing that the Court should
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rule-makers create and modify different rules at different points, via
different methods, and over time. Of course, the Court has disclaimed
any power to rewrite procedural rules under the guise of interpreting
them."7
Second, we must view this at a macro level. Substantively, this means
thinking of "federal law" as a whole, rather than on the level of individual
substantive legal rules. It also means considering the procedural regime
as a whole, as by considering the link between strict or liberal pleading
and broad or narrow discovery as part of one coherent, integrated
procedural regime. A procedural scheme might match predominant
substantive law in the jurisdiction at one point in time, but as new
substantive law is created (legislatively, judicially, or both), the
predominant substance changes, producing a mismatch with existing
procedure.
Third, Main focuses primarily on mismatches created by applying
new procedures to older or preexisting substantive laws .3 But current
controversies over pleading rules involve the opposite-mismatches
caused by new substantive law (for our purposes, civil- and constitutionalrights claims) litigated under old or preexisting procedural rules.
Fourth, neither substance nor procedure is static; both evolve over
time, especially as different rule-makers place their imprint on the body
of legal rules. Thus, we cannot think only of mismatches between new
substance and existing procedure or vice versa. We also must consider
mismatches that develop as each evolves. Procedure may be created with
one category of predominant existing substance in mind, but new and
different substance is created in light of existing procedure. And judicial
interpretation and construction of substance and procedure, new and
old, is ongoing. 9 Matches and mismatches erupt from this dynamic
process.
Fifth, mismatches often arise at the level of underlying values and
policies. Changes to procedural rules-especially through judicial
construction and interpretation-become necessary precisely to prevent
mismatches and diminution of the values underlying substance. This
perhaps explains the Supreme Court's sudden switch from unanimous
insistence that changes to pleading rules for civil rights cases must go
through the rulemaking process of the Rules Enabling Act (REA) to
pleading
stbadas. exlicitly policy-based, case-based ratcheting of

take a more activist role in interpreting Federal Rules that Congress has &hpowered
the Court to enact).
"~Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 298 (1969).
3'Main,
supra note 11I (manuscript at 27).
3Cf.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950-51 (2009) (describing new
developments as "construction" of Rule 8).
"Compare Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 515 (2002) and
Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S.
163, 168-69 (1993) with Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950-51; see also Bone, supra note 13, at
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Finally, whether a substance-procedure mismatch exists is not valueneutral; whether there is a mismatch, and the steps necessary to avoid or
remedy a mismatch, depends on the values the court or rule-maker
adopts and emphasizes. Conscious efforts to avoid a mismatch may, in
fact, produce one-it depends on the values we emphasize. In trying to
keep substance and procedure in step on one view of the legal rules and
their underlying values and purposes, rule-makers create a mismatch
under different views of those legal rules and their underlying values and
purposes. Iqbal was driven by the majority's focus on particular values at
issue in civil ights law-freeing government officials to vigorously pursue
the public interest without fear of the cost, burden, and distraction of
civil litigation 4 -that, in its view, were mismatched to the 1938 Rules
regime of liberal pleading and broad discovery. In doing so, however, it
created a mismatch with competing substantive policies, similarly central
to civil rights law-court access, victim compensation, deterring official
misconduct and vindication of constitutional liberties.
The link between underlying policy values and substance-procedure
mismatches supports arguments by several commentators that case-bycase adjudication in the Supreme Court-the process used to create the
new regime in Twombly and Iqbal-is not the optimal forum for designing
43
a stricter pleading rule. Strict pleading can be justified only by costbenefit balancing of the cost of meridess litigation, the difficulties for
plaintiffs in accessing essential pre-filing information, the impact of
litigation expenses oii government actor s, and considerations of the
moral component of the rights to be litigated-empirical analysis that
the Court is not institutionally competent to conduct. If we must resolve
underlying policy issues to determine the substance-procedure match,
those policy decisions should be made in a formal process for creating
prospective policy-either through Congress or the REA rulemaking
45
process (in which Congress plays a role) .

876-77; (arguing that case-by-case imposition of a pleading scheme is inappropriate);
Bone, supra note 3 (manuscript at 37-38) (same).
4'
Iqba4 129 S. Ct. at 1953-54; Bone, supra note 13, at 914; Bone, supra note 3
(manuscript at 34).
4Bone,
supra note 13, at 875-76; Bone, supra note 3 (manuscript at 33);
Burbank, supra note 8, at 113; Hillel Y. Levin, lqbal, Twombly, and the Lessons of the
Celotex Trilogy, I4 LEWIS &CLARK L. REv. 143, 145 (2010); see also Bone, supra note 13,
at 914 (ei~lhasizing that the moral weight of constitutional rights creates a right to
litigate a meritorious claim).
"' Bone, supra note 13, at 876; Burbank, supra note 8, at 116.
1Bone,
supra note 13, at 876-77, 932; Bone, supra note 3 (manuscript at 37-38);
Burbank, supra note 8, at 116.
45 Bone, supra note 3 (manuscript at 38); but see Moore, supra note 36,
at 1108-09
(arguing for the Court to adopt a more activist approach to interpreting the Rules,
given its role in creating the Rules and underlying policies); cf. Limited Court Access,
supra note 4.
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Civil Rights Litigation and ProceduralMismatches

Main provides a helpful explanatory model for the pleading
confusion in which we find ourselves-for Twombly, Iqbal, and the
ratcheting of pleading; for the evolution of the business of federal courts
under the Federal Rules, particularly as to civil rights claims; and for the
interaction of both phenomena.
When the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure took effect in 1938,
federal courts mostly were occupied with tort, contract, debt, and other
two-party business disputes, as well as federal patent claims.4 This
paradigm is reflected in the Forms appended to the Rules-short sample
complaints, deemed sufficient under the Rules, demonstrating how
pleadings should look in the paradigmatic federal-court cases.4 These
cases tended to be relatively straightforward procedurally and
substantively. They were dyadic disputes between just two or a small
number of parties, involving retrospective application of legal rules and
principles and retrospective remedies, usually damages .4 Parties often
were similarly situated individuals or business entities, just on opposite
sides of a legal and factual dispute. Parties were interchangeable and
their positions might change from case to case; an individual might as
easily be a tort plaintiff as a defendant, and a corporate entity mi~ht as
easily sue for breach of contract or patent infringement as be sued .
The liberal pleading regime of Rule 8 (a) (2), given life in Conley, as
well as the system of broad factual discovery that went with it, made sense
in this substantive regime . Plaintiffs possessed the information necessary
to plead the basic elements required for these claims under the
illustrative Forms; the plaintiff knew (or could know) at the outset what
happened at the intersection, whether her allegedly infringed-upon
patent was valid, or whether the debt had been paid. The visible
consequences of the conduct-a collision between a car and a pedestrian
and injuries to the latter-raise the inference of actionable misconduct.
A plaintiff could more easily plead a few pieces of information, known or
knowable first-hand, in skeletal fashion, and give the defendant "fair
notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it
rests" and the court a sense of the claim's basic validity.5' Moreover, it was
unlikely that discovery would be particularly wide-ranging, extensive,
time-consuming, or expensive in these cases because they usually focused

46 Epstein, supra note 3, at 62; Resnik, supra note 13, at 508; Wasserman, supra
note 13, at 802; see also Bone, supra note 13, at 896.
"' FED. R. Civ. P. 84; FED. R. Civ. P. Forms 10-21.
'8 Bone, supra note 13, at 896; Jay Tidmarsh, Pound's Ceniwy, and Ours, 81 NOTRE
DAME L. REv7. 513, 531 (2006); Wasserman, supra note 13, at 802.
"Judith Resnik, The Domain of Courts, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 2219, 2225 (1989);
Wasserman, supra note 13, at 807.
- See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957); Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495,
507 (1947).
"' Conley, 355 U.S. at 47.
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on discreet one-time deals or actions and few factual details likely were in
dispute.' There was no need to make true merit determinations too early
in the process; waiting until discovery and later pre-trial processes,
primarily summary judgment, did not produce unreasonable delay, cost,
or burden5 Nor was there uniform opposition to liberal pleading and
discovery from one group of litigants; because one might be plaintiff in
one case and defendant in the next, there were no repeat players always
on one side of litigation pushing for rules that systematically benefit that
side.
Federal social legislation and public-law litigation beginning in the
1960s and '70s changed the substantive paradigm of federal litigation,
and we have been struggling since with the degree to which federal
procedure must change to avoid a mismatch with its new substance.
'[he substantive change has been ajoint venture of Congress and the
courts. Congress took the lead with legislation prohibiting discrimination
because of race, sex, national origin, disability, age, and other
characteristics in employment, public accommodations, housing, and
institutions receiving federal funds . Congress and the courts together
have made such statutes privately enforceable, recognizing the public
benefit of private litigation.55 The Court itself ushered in the era of
serious constitutional litigation when it resuscitated 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a
long-moribund provision of the Reconstruction Era, and turned it into a
meaningful and powerful vehicle for enforcing federal constitutional
rights.5' The Court expansively interpreted the statutory requirenment of
action "under color" of state law so the Constitution would reach
misconduct by all public officials acting randomly and individually even if
in violation of state law-officials who misuse power through conduct
made possible only because the official was "clothed with the authority"
of state law.' The Court also recognized that otherwise private entities
may be subject to constitutional liability for engaging in forms of joint

.supranote 13, at 896; see also Epstein, supra note 3, at 70.
Marcus, supra note 30, at 484.
54 Title VII of The Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L.
No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-4 (2006)); Title IX of the
Educational Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, 86 Stat. 373 (codified as
amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-88 (2006)); Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990,
Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-81

Bone,

(2006)).
5See, e.g., Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 688-89 & n.9 (1979); Newman
V.Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 401-02 (1968).
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961); Myriam E.
Gilles, Breaking the Code of Silence: &ediscovering "Custom" in Section 1983 Municipal
Liability, 80 B.U. L. Rrv. 17, 23-25 (2000); Wasserman, supra note 13, at 803.
Monroe, 365 U.S. at 184-85 (quoting United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326
(1941) and citing Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 108 (1945)); Gilles, supra note
56, at 25.
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action with government. 58 And the Court alone created constitutional
damages litigation against federal officers when it recognized an implied

right of action in the Bill of Rights

9

itself.5'

Civil rights litigation was virtually unheard of in 1938, but (together
with complex antitrust, securities, and environmental cases) now forms
the new "predominant" federal substantive law and the new paradigm of
60
federal civil litigation . Much of this substance was created in the shadow
of the 1938 Federal Rules, Conley, and the regime of liberal pleading and
broad discovery. Thus, on Main's model, Iqbats creation of more rigid
pleading (and concomitant limits on discovery) actually produces a
procedure-substance mismatch with § 1983 and constitutional litigation.
But rule-makers, -particularly courts, have identified a mismatch in
the opposite direction-significant differences between the 1938 privatelitigation paradigm and the new public-law, civil rights litigation
paradigm demonstrate the dissonance between the existing liberal
61
pleading regime and the new substance. Old procedure is "not well
suited" to the new substantive constitutional litigation . The values and
principles underlying the new, evolved substance are undermined by the
preexisting procedural regime, even if the new substance was created
against the backdrop of that regime. Procedure had to change to prevent
a mismatch that would diminish and defeat substantive values-and it
had to change through the immediate act of judicial interpretation and
construction, rather than via the longer route of prospective rulemaking.
On this view, Iqbal's ratcheting pleading and limiting discovery was
necessary to prevent a dangerous mismatch between seventy-year-old
procedure and newer substance.
Five features of civil rights (particularly constitutional) litigation
render it a mismatch with the procedural regime of Conley and the 1938
Rules. And these features perhaps explain Iqbal and Twombly, as well as
the political and ideological controversy that now surrounds pleading.
First, public-law litigation is often less about discrete individual
unlawful acts on the ground (although such acts certainly must have
occurred), than about the content and enforcement of government
policy and violations of rights caused by that policy through individual
" Brentwood Acad. v. Tennessee Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288,
295-96 (2001); West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 50-51 (1988); Burton v. Wilmington
Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 723-25 (1961).
" Bivens v'. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388, 397 (1971); see alsoAshcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1948 (2009); Wilkie v.
Robbins, 127 S. Ct 2588, 2597 (2007); cf. James E. Pfander & David Baltmanis,
Rethinking Bivens: Legitimacy and Constitutional Adjudication, 98 GEO. L.J. 117, 121
(2009) (arguing that Congress has preserved and ratified the Bivens remedy to make
it routinely available for constitutional claims against federal officers).
0 Cf. Epstein, supra note 3, at 66 (suggesting that the 1938 Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure are not well suited to modem litigation, especially antitrust suits); and
supra note 16.
61Epstein,
supra note 3, at 70-71.
62Id.

at 66.
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acts of enforcement. Policy causes harm over a longer period of time and
to a potentially larger number of people. Constitutional litigation targets
not only actors on the ground, but also supervisory officers and
government entities who enact policy and guide officers in their
enforcement. This is of a piece with the general evolution of substantive
law away from precise rules into more complex general standards and
principles, which has reduced the overall utility of plad n.6
Discovery in these actions is presumed to be broader, more
burdensome, and costlier than in the earlier world of contracts, debts,
and traffic accidents." Discovery now must inquire into written and
unwritten policies and customs of executive departments and agencies or
into high-level meetings and conversations about such policies, not to
mention into the minds of government officials. Such wide-ranging
discovery threatens to hinder the business of government and socially
beneficial conduct by tying up officials in litigation over claims that will
and should ultimately fail, distracting and chilling officials from vigorous
exercise of public office .
Second is the problem of "information asymmetry" at the pleading
stage. This is a common structural feature of modern federal litigation,
particularly civil rights, where key relevant information is uniquely in
defendants' hands, unknown to the plaintiff at the time of pleading and
unknowable without opportunity for discovery.6 In fact, post- Twombly and
Iqbal, courts have incentive to deny all discovery until the complaint
survives a 12 (b) (6) motion testing the sufficiency of tihe pleading. 7 And if
the complaint cannot survive-a more likely result under a stricter
pleading regime-the plaintiff never will have an opportunity to truly test
the merits of the claim." 8
The two most notable pieces of information that are beyond
plaintiffs reach at the outset are evidence of defendants' subjective state
of mind and evidence of defendants' private, behind-closed-doors
conduct.6 As to the former, defendants' intent is an element for
individual liability, supervisory liability, and governmental liability as to a
range of constitutional rights; what officials intended or what highranking officials knew about the conduct of underlings is essential for
establishing liability and obtaining a remedy.7
Indeed some
63Marcus,

64

supra note 30, at 459-60.

Bone, supra note 13, at 896-97.

6Iqbal,
129 S. Ct. at 1953'-54; Bone, supra note 13, at 914; Bone, supra note 3
(manuscript at 34).
6Bone,
supra note 3 (manuscript at 27, 33); Hoffman, supra note 6, at 1261-62;
Marcus, supra note 30, at 468; Steinman, supra note 3 (manuscript at 21-22).
6' See, eg., Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 966-67 (9th Cir. 2009); but see
Edward A. Hartnett, Taming Twombly, 158 U. PA. L. RI~v. (forthcoming 2010)
(manuscript at 44) available at http://ssrn.com/astrac=1452875.
6Steinman,
supra note 3 (manuscript at 22-23).
6Bone, supra note 3 (manuscript at 33).
7Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1948-49 (2009) (supervisory liability for
racial, ethnic, and religious discrimination under the First and Fifth Amendments);
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governmental conduct is entirely lawful unless committed for an
improper purpose. Facts about state of mind obviously rests with
defendant officers and are discoverable only if there is an opportunity to
depose the officers in discovery. This is why, even under true heightened
pleading for allegations of fraud and mistake under Rule 9(b), state of
mind still can be alleged "generally," that is, without factual deai
Alternatively, to the extent a challenge is to formal or informal
governmental or agency policies and practices, information about the
process and purpose in making those policies is necessary and only
gained through some court-supervised discovery. Plaintiffs must be able
to learn about particular meetings and conversations, which individuals
were involved, when and where meetings occurred, what was discussed,
and, ultimately, who knew what, when, and why.
We thus confront the paradox of civil rights pleading. Discovery
cannot be had until the plaintiff drafts, files, and serves a sufficient
complaint." But because wide-ranging discovery poses a greater risk of
hindering socially beneficial conduct, pleading must serve as a
meaningful hurdle in civil rights actions and Rule 12 must provide
meaningful review to ensure that government defendants are not
subjected to the burdens except in seemingly meritorious cases.7 From
plaintiffs standpoint, however, skeletal and conclusory pleading is even
more necessary in these cases precisely because the information needed
to sufficiently plead essential factual details demanded by Iqbal as a
condition of getting to discovery is impossible without discovery. And
there are no mechanisms within the Federal Rules for formal pre-filing
investigative dsoey
Fair pleading rules should eliminate the paradox; Iqbaljust draws us
further into it.
One response is that plaintiffs can engage in informal pre-filing
discovery outside the Rules to gather information enabling them to
produce a more-than-conclusory complaint. Complaints can be drafted
based on publicly available materials-statements by executive-branch

County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 849-50 (1998) (substantive due process
requiring "conscience-shocking" activity taken with deliberate indifference to
constitutional rights); Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 407-08 (1997)
(municipal liability); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976) (intentional race
discrimination by government actor required under Fourteenth Amendment claim);
Moss, 572 F.3d at 970 (individual liability for viewpoint-discriminatory arrest under
the First Amendment); see inratext accompanying note 97.
71

FED. R. Crv. P. 9(b).

n Lonny Sheinkopf Hoffman, Access to Information, Access to justice: The Role of
Presuit Investigatory Discovery, 40 U. MicH.J.L. REFORM 217, 225 (2007); but see Hartnett,
supra note 67 (manuscript at 44).
7, Bone, supra note 13, at 897; Epstein, supra note 3, at 71-72.
7'
Bone, supra note 3 (manuscript at 33); Hoffman, supra note 6, at 1262-63;
Spencer, Civil Rights, supra note 3, at 160; Steinman, supra note 3 (manuscript at 2122, 64).
75 Hoffman, supra note 72, at 226-28.
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officials to Congress, media reports of public statements and conduct,
and governmental investigations and reporting of underlying events,
policies, and activities. In fact, pleadings in several constitutional
damages challenges to War on Terror policies have relied, in whole or in
part, on material already in the public record .7 But for many plaintiffs
and plaintiffs' attorneys, that process may be prohibitively expensive.
More problematic, the public record will not reveal information about
non-public internal workings, thoughts, and actions of government
agencies and officials, information that Iqbal nevertheless demands
plaintiffs plead at the outset.
Plaintiffs also might use the Freedom of Information Act (FOJA)
(federal or state counterparts)"1 as a discovery tool as to policies, policy
discussions, and memoranda of public agencies, although delays
inherent in those procedures may prevent plaintiffs from obtaining
needed information within the necessary limitations window for filing a
claim .7 And, of course, FOLA does nothing to enable plaintiffs to
uncover or allege discriminatory intent of individual officials (other than,
perhaps, by inferences that the court may feel free to reject).
Iqbal demonstrates how the absence of discovery undermines
plaintiffs at the first step. By denying a presumption of truth to bald,
conclusory allegations, courts can disregard allegations going to state of
mind and other facts about which the plaintiff cannot know enough to
plead in detail or other than through a general allegation. For example,
the Iqbal majority ignored the following allegations: 1) that Ashcroft and
Muller "'knew of, condoned, and willfully and maliciously agreed to
subject [plaintiffi' to harsh conditions of confinement 'as a matter of
policy, solely on account of [his] religion, race, and/or national origin;'"
2) that Ashcroft was the "principal architect" of the discriminatory
detention policy; and 3) that Mueller was "instrumental" in adopting and
executing that policy.' 9 The court found these allegations deficient
because they did not identify', even in most general terms, the content of
the policy or agreement to which the officers were party; they identified
the consequences of that alleged policy (the plaintiff was detained and
suffered abuse at the hands of on-the-ground officers), but not the
necessary intent in anything more than a "formulaic recitation.""0

"6 See, e.g., al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 F.3d 949, 975-76 (9th Cir. 2009); Padilla v.
Yoo, 633 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1019-20 (N.D. Cal. 2009); see also Epstein, supra note 3, at
81 (proposing standard for evaluating complaints in which plaintiffs rely exclusively
on public sources).
17 U.S.C. § 552 (2006); Hoffman, supra note 72, at 246.
7s See Mark H. Grunewald, E-FOIA and the "Mother of All Complaints:" Information
Delivety and Delay Reduction, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 345, 345 (1998).
7Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1951 (2009) (quoting First Amended
Complaint and Jury Demand at 1 10-11, 96, Elmaghraby v. Ashcroft, No. 04 CV 1809
(JG) JA), 2005 'AL 2375202 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2005)).
"Id. (quoting Bell Atd. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1965 (2007)).
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There is an argument that these allegations are not, in fact, bald and
conclusory. 8 1 More troubling, it is not clear what else plaintiff could have
said at the point of drafting the complaint-what other language could
he use to allege that two high government officials had designed and
implemented a policy with discriminatory intent other than a statement
saying so? Plaintiffs cannot identify the content of an agreement or
conversation to which they were not party or privy until they gain access
to documents and information about relevant conversations. Plaintiffs
2
cannot know "what Ashcroft and Mueller actually did vis-;I-vis Iqbal"
until they can inquire into past events (meetings, conversations, etc.) at
which plaintiffs were not present. Plaintiffs cannot know what defendants
intended by some conduct until they can ask them, in the formal setting
of a deposition taken under oath. Knowledge of these past events and
individual thoughts only can be gained through the discovery process.
Prior to that point, the plaintiff only can plead what he sees-the
consequences of the policy.
Third, discovery plays a unique role in civil rights litigation, even
functioning as an end in itself. This is somewhat inherent in the U.S. civil
justice system as a whole. Absent the vigorous regulatory and
compensatory mechanisms existing elsewhere, the United States relies on
civil litigation to expose, remedy, and deter wrongdoing, and to enforce
(and, where necessary, reform) legal and social norms. "3Fact
investigation is essential to that process, which is why discovery is
84
necessarily broader in the United States than in other legal systems.
Civil rights plaintiffs (and their lawyers) operate as private attorneys
general, complementing government investigation and enforcement of
federal law and ensuring accountability for official misconduct, thereby
15
furthering the public good . Although compensation certainly is a
significant goal for damages plaintiffs, available damages are often quite
limited for constitutional claims, especially those not involving physical
86
injuries, loss of property, or the consequences of arrest or incarceration .
It is logical that these private attorneys general litigate in furtherance of

8" Or at least no more so than other allegations that the majority accepted and
accorded a presumption of truth. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1961 (Souterj, dissenting).

Steinman, supra note 3 (manuscript at 46).
Bone, supra note 13, at 875; Stephen B. Burbank, Pleading and the Dilemmas of
'General Rules, "2009 Wis. L. REv. 535, 561; Marcus, supra note 15, at 324; Stephen N.
Subrin, Discovery in Global Perspective: Are We Nuts?, 52 DEPAUL L. REv. 299, 310-11
(2002).
84 Subrin, supra note 83, at 311.
83 City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 574 (1986); Patrick Higginbotham,
Forward, 49 ALA. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (1997); Pamela S. Karlan, Disarming the Private Attorney
General, 2003 U. ILL. L. Rrv. 183, 186-87; Marcus, supra note 30, at 471-72;
Wasserman, supra note 13, at 801.
86 City of Riverside, 477 U.S. at 574; Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S.
299, 306-07 (1986).
82
8"
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an equally important goal-deterring future government misconduct by

exposing

87

it.

Court-supervised discovery is essential to exposing and deterring
official misconduct.8 Private attorneys general lack the free-standing
investigative and subpoena authority that the real attorney general
possesses. A private attorney general cannot enforce federal rights and
deter wrongdoing absent a genuine opportunity to investigate and
uncover unconstitutional behavior. That investigation demands the
judicial hammer to enforce government defendants' discovery
obligations and third-party subpoenas. Those obligations (and court
supervision of those obligations) are triggered only after successful
initiation of litigation.
Clearly this is a different model of discovery than what justice
Murphy sanguinely praised in Hickman v. Taylor.8 And it is a model that
the Iqbal Court clearly rejected while setting pleading standards so that
fewer cases reach judicially enforced discovery. This reveals widespread
distaste for discovery and support for according increased protection for
government officials (i.e., defendants in constitutional actions) against
the distraction of having to litigate and submit to discovery at the cost of
being able to focus on their public offices. 90 As justice Scalia inimitably
put it during Iqbal arguments: "Well, I mean, that's lovely, that-that thethe ability of the Attorney General and Director of the FBI to-to do their
jobs without having to litigate personal liability is dependent upon the
discretionary decision of a single districtjudge." 9'
Fourth, and related, government defendants are entitled to official
defenses, notably absolute legislative, prosecutorial, and judicial
immunities9 and (more commonly) the default executive qualified
immunity at issue in IqbaL.913 All are defined as granting protection not
only from liability, but from litigation itself and from having to incur the
"City of Riverside, 477 U.S. at 575; Karlan, supra note 85, at 187; William B.
Rubinstein, On What a "PrivateAttorney General" Is-And Why it Matters, 57 VAND. L.
Rrv. 2129, 21 71-72 (2004).
88Marcus, supra note 15, at 323-24.
"329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947) (" [T] he deposition-discovery rules are to be accorded
a broad and liberal treatment... . Mutual knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered
by both parties is essential to proper litigation.").
'0Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1953 (2009).
"Transcript of Oral Argument at 35-36, Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (comment of
justice Scalia); but see id. at 60 (comment ofJustice Stevens) (stating, to laughter, that
he did not believe there was a rule that government officials need not testify' at
proceedings when he wrote the opinion for the unanimous Court in Clinton v. Jones,
allowing civil litigation to go for-ward against a sitting President).
9" Van
de Kamp v. Goldstein, 129 S. Ct. 855, 859-60 (2009) (absolute
prosecutorial immunity); Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 44, 49 (1998) (absolute
legislative immunity); Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991) (absolute judicial
immunity).
"Iqba4 129 S. Ct. at 1945-46; Pear-son v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 815-16 (2009);
Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 525-26 (1985); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800,
817-18 (1982).
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cost, burden, and distraction of being parties . Immunity enables
government officials to act vigorously on behalf of the public, without
fear of personal liability chilling the exercise of their best judgment or
dissuading them from seeking public service in the first placei'. This
means getting the defendant out of the action as early as possible and
protecting him from broad-ranging discovery, particularly having to sit
for a deposition or other inquiries into private conduct and state of
mind . Liberal pleading and broad discovery thus are seen as uniquely
inconsistent with constitutional litigation under Bivens and § 1983, given
the potential burden on government-officer defendants.
On the other hand, the relevant facts in these cases make detailed
pleading impossible and discovery inevitable. Defendants' subjective state
of mind, the quintessential fact known and knowable only to the
defendant at the outset of litigation, is an element of many constitutional
violations. Supervising officers are not liable on a respondeat superior
liability theory, but only for their actual misconduct, which requires
allegations and proof of some state of mind . Iqbal adds the further twist
that the claims were not only against supervisory officers, but against two
officials at the very top of the Department of justice (Attorney General
and Director of the FBI) with responsibility for creating all manner of
federal law-enforcement policy and entitled to even greater judicial
respect and greater judicial caution before imposing on them litigation
and discovery. Moreover, the case involved policies aimed at combating
terrorism and protecting national security in the wake of September
11Ith, a "national and international security emergency unprecedented in
the history of the American Republic," 9 9 prompting an ever-more
heightened degree of judicial deference for executive decision-making
and for officials' immunity from the burden and expense of discovery.
Indeed, one arguable limit on Iqbal might have been that it was so linked
to the underlying policies of qualified immunity and protecting the
highest-level cabinet officials that its heightened pleading ought not be
applicable in cases where those policy concerns are not in play-such as
non-civil rights claims or civil rights claims against ground-level, nonpolicymaking, non-cabinet-level officials.' 00

9Iqbal,
129 S. Ct. at 1946 (citing Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526).
"' Mitchell4 472 U.S. at 525 (citing Harlow, 457 U.S. at 819); Bone, supra note 13,
at 914.
"' Pearson, 129 S. Ct. at 815.
17 See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
"~ Iqbal has thrown the precise state of mind standard into flux. CompareIqbal, 129
S. Ct. at 1948-49, with id. at 1958 (Souter,J., dissenting) (citing range of lower-court
standards for supervisory liability, most of which require less than intent).
"Id. at 1953 (quoting Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 179 (2d Cir. 2007)); Bone,
sup/ra note 3 (manuscript at 36).
100See, e.g, Smith v. Duffey, 576 F.3d 336, 340 (7th Cir. 2009) (Posner, J.)
(emphasizing context of qualified immunity in suggesting Iqbal might not be
applicable in basic fraud case).
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Alternatively, procedural rules should be more forgiving of civil
rights claims, to ensure that substantive policies in enforcing
constitutional rights against government officials are vindicated. There is,
Robert Bone suggests, a moral component to civil rights claims; pleading
rules that screen out valid constitutional claims and thus prevent
vindication of those rights must be measured in moral terms to strike the
appropriate rule-pleading balance.'0 ' More generally, procedural rules
should support, rather than undermine, plaintiffs who act as private
attorneys general and seek to enforce the Constitution, ensure
0
government accountability, and benefit the public at lre
0
3
We return to the non-neutral nature of mismatches.
On one view,
Iqbal created a substance-procedure mismatch by establishing a pleading
regime inconsistent with a substantial category of substantive federal law.
But on a different view, the Court avoided a substance-procedure
mismatch-between subjecting government defendants to litigation and
discovery that comes with liberal pleading, the substantive policies of
official immunity, and limited supervisory liability that demands a quick
and easy exit for constitutional defendants. The divide over Iqbal, then, is
which policies-vindication of constitutional rights by private attorneys
general, or protecting government-officer defendants from discovery in
(potentially) weak or non-meritorious litigation at the earliest possible
moment-should be emphasized and which should define and yield to
the procedural mismatch.
The further divide is whether the value and policy choices and
empirical analysis inherent in creating and avoiding substance-procedure
mismatches should be left to a prospective rulemaking process (whether
the REA or Congress), rather than to case-based adjudication before the
Court.

04

At least some in Congress want policy choice left to them-and

vocal forces prefer to return to a pre-Twombly/Iqbal regime, better
matched to substantive civil rights law. 0 5 This suggests that substantive
civil rights law had previously been sufficiently in sync (not mismatched)
with Conley's looser pleading regime, and the Court and Iqbal created the
procedural mismatch. At a minimum, Stephen Burbank argues, we
should return to the status quo prior to Twombly until Congress or the
REA process can make those value judgments and identify and enact the
best pleading regime.'
'0' Bone, supra note 13, at 914, 932; Bone, supra note 3 (manuscript at 33).
0" Carl Tobias, The Transformation of Trans-Substantivity, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REv.
1501, 1502 (1992); Wasserman, supra note 13, at 804-05.
"'S See supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text.
'Bone, supra note 13, at 876-77; Bone, supra note 3 (manuscript at 38);
Burbank, supra note 8, at 116.
"See Open Access to Courts Act of 2009, H.R. 4115, 111 th Cong. (2009); Notice
Pleading Restoration Act of 2009, S. 1504, 111 th Cong. (2009); Limited Court Access,
supra note 4.
'06 Limited Court Access, supra note 4, at 22 (statement of Stephen B. Burbank),
available at http://judiciar-y.senate.gov/pdf/I 2-02-09%2OBurbank%2OTestimony.pdf.
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111. WH4AT IQBAL HATH WROUGHT
A.

PleadingAfter Iqbal

At this early stage, there are as many predictions as to Iqbals future
effect (assuming it is not abrogated by legislation or an amended rule) as
there are predictors.
Perhaps Iqbal will be (or should be) confined to civil rights claims,
given the centrality of qualified immunity and the particular (perceived)
inconsistency between relaxed pleading/broad discovery and a defense
to even having to participate in litigation. Perhaps Iqbal is unique even
among Bivens actions, since the target there was cabinet-level
policymaking officials promulgating and enforcing national-security
policy in the wake of the trauma of September I11th. 0 7 Of course, nothing
in Iqbal so limits the holding.'
Alternatively, perhaps Iqbal did not change much, even as to
constitutional litigation. Civil rights claims long have been dismissed as
"disfavored claims" of which procedural rules should be less solicitous.10
In fact, Jqbal is merely the latest volley in an ongoing back-and-forth
among the Supreme Court, lower courts, and commentators about the
proper pleading standard for civil rights claims. The Supreme Court
twice sought to pull back the reins on lower courts, insisting
emphatically, explicitly, and unanimously that Conley and notice pleading
remained good law and barred lower courts from heightening the
pleading rules in municipal liability and employment discrimination
cases. 10Lower courts responded to these decisions in a variety of wayssome following the command, others limiting the precedents to their
contexts, others seeming to ignore the Court entirely." And when the
Supreme Court initially opened the door to heightened pleading by
introducing the plausibility requirement in Twombly, lower courts
pounced most readily in civil rights cases." 2 Iqbal and Twombly may act as
little more than an invitation or confirmation to lower courts to do
precisely what they had been doing all along.' 13

129 S. Ct. at 1953; Bone, supra note 3 (manuscript at 36); and supra
notes 98-100 and accompanying text.
18Bone, supra note 3 (manuscript at 34) ("[T] he Iqbal Court does not confine its
holding to qualified immunity cases.").
'09 Marcus, supra note 30, at 471; Spencer, Civil Rights, supra note 3, at 158-59;
Carl Tobias, Public Law Litigation and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 74 CORNELL L.
Rrv. 270, 300 (1989).
"'0 See Sivierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512-13 (2002); Leathermuan v.
Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168
(1993); Steinman, supra note 3 (manuscript at 9-11); Spencer, Civil Rights, supra note
3, at 114-18.
..See Christopher M. Fairman, Heightened Pleading, 81 TEX. L. Rrv. 551, 583-90
(2002); Spencer, Civil Rights, supra note 3, at 118-20.
12See Spencer, Civil Rights, supra note 3, at 126, 158-59.
See id. at 158; supra note 25 and accompanying text.
"'7 See Iqbal,
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Adam Steinman has a uniquely sanguine view of Iqbal He argues
that, because Iqbal did not purport to overturn either Swierkiewicz or
Leatherman, all three cases remain good law and lower courts must
reconcile them."14 Steinman proposes a two-step approach to doing so
that maps onto Iqbats two-step. First, Steinman argues for a narrow,
transaction-based definition of conclusory, thus limiting the sorts of
allegations that can be disregarded or denied a presumption of truth at
the 12(b) (6) stage. An allegation is not conclusory merely because it
lacks detail or supporting information and evidence, because Swierkiewicz
makes clear that detail is not required. 15Instead,
an allegation is not
conclusory so long as it identifies an "adequate transactional narrative," a
tangible act or event that has occurred, or some real-world transaction or
occurrence that took place.116 The complaint must identify the "core
content" of a particular transaction, what the defendants actually did,
even without detail or explanation of how or why an event is
characterized some way."17 And all such non-conclusory allegations must
8
be accepted as true."1

Second, having provided only (or mostly) non-conclusory allegations
as to each element, the complaint necessarily survives the second-step
plausibility inquiry. Steinman insists "a complaint that does provide nonconclusory allegations on every element of a claim, by definition, exceeds
the threshold of plausibly suggesting an entitlement to relief for purposes
of Iqbal step two."" 9
There is much to recommend Steinman's approach to pleading as a
normative matter, particularly in civil rights actions, given information
asymmetries and plaintiffs' general inability to know or plead necessary
details at the outset. "0But it is descriptively out of step with Iqbal and with
what lower courts have done in quickly embracing Iqbal (and Twombly)
and exercising an enhanced power to review and reject complaints.
In particular, Steinman pays insufficient weight to judicial power at
step two to closely examine the conduct alleged in non-conclusory
fashion and to impose its own best subjective explanation for what
happened based on her 'Judicial experience and common sense."'12' Of
course, even pre-Twombly courts recognized that a pleading must do
more than blandly assert that "Defendant violated Plaintiffs rights" and
Steinman, supra note 3 (manuscript at 29-32).
Id. (manuscript at 52-53); see also Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 511; but see Spencer,
Understanding Pleading, supra note 3, at 16 (arguing that additional allegations
suggesting a wrongful termination are necessary, contra Swierkiewvicz).
1Steinman,
supra note 3 (manuscript at 50).
11' Id. (manuscript at 46, 52-53).
...
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949-50 (2009); Steinman, supra note 3
(manuscript at 54, 61).
"' Steinman, supra note 3 (manuscript at 26).
'Id.
(manuscript at 21-22, 63-64); see supra Part IB.
"Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950; see also Bell Ad. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955,
1970 (2007) (considering "common economic experience" in evaluating antitrust
allegations).
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courts would disregard truly outlandish or fanciful allegations (such as
allegations about alien abduction). Iqbal cedes even more authority. The
point is that judges no longer are obligated, in accepting non-conclusory
facts as true, to read those facts together and as a coherent whole in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff;, they instead enjoy broad discretion
to parse the complaint and individual allegations and to screen
aggressively for a story that resonates with them.' 'judges may accord less
deference to the plaintiffs pled version of events in favor of a different
(not unlawful) explanation that (in the court's view) makes more sense.
That judicial explanation may be based on baseline assumptions about
the world that each different judge brings to bear based on her own
underlying experiences; this in turn affects the result of her wielding
experience and common sense in evaluating what is the "plausible"
explanation for some events and actions.12
Twombly and Jqbal together suggest that courts may look not for a
conclusion of liability that is plausible, but for whether that conclusion is
the more (or most) plausible one. The Twombly Court insisted that a
complaint is not plausible, and thus not sufficient, if there is a lawful
explanation consistent with the facts alleged; neutral allegations do not
state a plausible entitlement to relief. 24 Thus, where the nub of the
antitrust complaint was parallel conduct that does not (without more)
violate substantive antitrust law, the complaint did not plausibly suggest a
violation of federal law.' 2 5 Iqbal went one step further. Faced with two
explanations for a policy of seizing and detaining Arab and Muslim
illegal immigrants after September 11th-"'the purposeful, invidious
discrimination respondent asks us to infer," or a merely logical (if
disparate) result of seeking to protect the United States from those who
had potential connections to those who committed the September 11th
terrorist attacks-the Court accepted the latter inference, even though it
was not the one pled (and even though it is hardly an irrational
conclusion) and held that discrimination was not a plausible explanation
this
for the conduct and policies described in the complaint. 16And

122 Burbank, supra note 8, at 115; Bone, supra note 13, at 889; Bone, supra note 3
(manuscript at 22-23) (arguing that the complaint "must be interpreted as a
coherent whole, and the sufficiency of its allegations must be evaluated in a holistic
way").
2Burbank,
supra note 8, at 118; Hartnett, supra note 67 (manuscript at 35);
Steinman, supra note 3 (manuscript at 22 & n. 119).
121 Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1965-66; see also Bone, supra note 13, at 878 (arguing
that the new pleading rules require "no more than that the allegations describe a
state of affairs that differs significantly from a baseline of normality and supports a
probability of wrongdoing greater than the background probability for situations of
the same general type"); Spencer, Understanding Pleading, supra note 3, at 15-16
(distingishing hetween allegations that suggest wrongdoing and those that are
neutral as to wrongdoing).
13Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1970-71.
16Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1951-52.
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conclusion as to plausibility perhaps flowed from the shared common
7
sense and executive-branch experience of the majorityjustices. 11
Finally, lower courts have not limited use of this new power only to
the Iqbal paradigm. Rather, they have increased demand for greater facts
in all manner of complaints, beyond civil rights 1"and certainly as to runof-the-mill civil rights actions.'2' The unfortunate result will be a higher,
often-insurmountable pleading burden for plaintiffs, increased use of
Rule 12(b) (6) as a costly litigation tool," and increased defendant
success in using that tool to defeat claims that can be properly evaluated
only after discovery.
The substantive consequence will be a significant decrease in
vindication of federal constitutional and civil rights, and of the values
and principles underlying those rights. We can predict less private
attorney general activity, less exposure of governmental wrongdoing, less
enforcement of constitutional and civil rights, and less opportunity to
even make a serious inquiry into the underlying facts and events for
failure to clear the pleading hurdle.
Importantly, this decrease in substantive enforcement stems from
procedure-from imposing burdens on plaintiffs to present substantial
factual detail at the outset of litigation, even detail they do not and
cannot know, and from empowering courts to form their own
conclusions about alleged misconduct based on factual allegations. It
stems, in other words, from a judicially created mismatch between
current pleading procedure and this category of substantive federal law.
B.

Iqbal in Action: Moss v. U.S. Secret Service

A good illustration of the consequences of this new regime-and
what lower courts can, and perhaps often will, do with their newly found
(or newly reenergized) discretion-comes from the Ninth Circuit in Moss
v. US. Secret Service,'13 ' decided just two months after Iqbal. The case is
more of a typical Bivens action, lacking the unique elements that
warranted increased scrutiny of pleadings in Iqbal itself-no cabinet-level
policymnaking officers, no challenge to War on Terror policies (although
national security was an underlying issue), and the primary targets were
directly responsible, on-the-scene officers. It also was a First Amendment
case, for which courts often show greater solicitude.
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Hartnett, supra note 67 (manuscript at 34).

See, e.g., Branham v. Dolgencorp, Inc., No. 6:09-CV-00037, 2009 WL 2604447,
at *2 (W.D. Va. Aug. 24, 2009) (applying Iqbal and Twombly to dismiss complaint in
slip-and-fall for failing to allege how liquid came to be on floor).
'2' Infra Part III.B.
"Posting of Jonathan Siegel to Concurring Opinions, Iqbal Empirics,
http://wwiv.concurringopinions.com/archives/2009/09/iqbal-empirics.html
(Sept.
9, 2009, 6:50 AM).
'"' 572 F.3d 962 (9th Cir. 2009).
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But in dismissing the complaint as insufficient, the court applied an
analysis and reached an outcome that demonstrates the difficulties civil
rights plaintiffs likely will face in a broad range of cases under this new,
mismatched pleading paradigm. The court explicitly recognized the
significant change wrought by Jqbal and its far-reaching implications.13
And the court put those changes into action-going to great lengths to
find some allegations too conclusory and to ignore the pled explanations
for events, to find lawful explanations for non-conclusively alleged
conduct, and to reject the alleged First Amendment violation as
implausible on the facts.
The plaintiffs were part of a group who in 2004 sought to protest
across the street from an inn in Oregon where President George W. Bush
was eating.13 3 The Secret Service agents on the scene ordered local police
to move the protesters away from the inn and one block to the east; local
police actually pushed them more than two blocks away.13 4 A group of
counter-protesters, supportive of the President, had set up a block west of
the inn (interactions between the groups were cordial), but were not
brought First
moved, screened, or otherwise inconvenienced. 15Plaintiffs
Amendment claims against the two Secret Service agents on the scene,
the former director of the Service, and the Service itself. The basic claims
were that plaintiffs were moved because they were speaking against the
President and that this was in keeping with a sub rosa viewpointdiscriminatory Secret Service policy of suppressing speech critical of the
President. 3 6 The district court stayed discovery pending resolution of the
Rule 12 (b) (6) motion, meanin the plaintiffs never had an opportunity
3
to uncover facts and evidence.'1
The Ninth Circuit followed the two-step approach mandated by Iqbal.
The court first disregarded as bald, conclusory, and not entitled to a
presumption of truth allegations that 1) the on-the-scene agents acted
with an impermissible viewpoint-discriminatory motive, and 2) the
Service had a sub rosa policy of discriminating against anti-Bush protesters
based on their anti-Bush viewpoints. 38 The court's analysis demonstrates
the problem with increased scrutiny of conclusory allegations. There is
nothing more plaintiffs could have said at this point to allege viewpointdiscriminatory intent by the agents, other than a direct allegation that
the agents acted with that impermissible intent. They could not point to
and describe any "tangible act or event" giving rise to the inference of
intent, any real-world transaction or occurrence revealing intent, because
they were not present when the act-the order to move them-took
place. They lacked first-hand knowledge of that intent, since state of
Id. at 972.
..
2

"'Id.at 965.
134

id.

115

Id. at 965-66; see also id. at 975 app. (providing map of area).

'36
11

Id. at 966.
Id. at 966-67.
Id. at 970.
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mind obviously rests with the defendant and is unknowable without
discovery. The plaintiffs formed a belief based on a consequence-the
known fact that they were ordered to move-that the reason was
viewpoint discrimination, and they alleged that in the only way possible.
They can prove that conclusion only after an opportunity to depose the
defendants.
Similarly, prior to an opportunity to inquire into the policies and
workings of the agency, plaintiffs lacked any way to allege the existence of
Service policy in greater detail; they could not know what events,
meetings, or conversations occurred among which actors in the agency to
put this unofficial policy into place. Perhaps they could have pled other
examples of similar Service handling of protesters, if other examples
were publicly known. But pleading (and proving) a policy still requires
that supervisory officials knew about those other incidents and intended
to allow such viewpoint discrimination as a matter of custom and policy;
this again requires facts as to defendants' subjective state of mind, which
are impossible to allege in a non-conclusory manner pre-discovery.
Finally, while FOJA might be useful as a pre-filing discovery tool for
uncovering formal and official agency policies and memoranda, the
allegation here was of a sub rosa policy-a widely accepted custom not
reduced to writing or formal rule-not likely to be uncovered other than
through depositions and close review of agency files, which do not occur
through FOJA.
This brought the court to Iqbal's second step and whether the
remaining, non-conclusory allegations, accorded a presumption of truth,
plausibly gave rise to an entitlement to relief. 19We
then see a court
willing to aggressively screen, to find a pleading not plausible based on
judicially identified alternative explanations for the conduct alleged,
explanations that are, on the court's subjective "experience and common
sense," more plausible. 10Indeed,
Moss illustrates the lengths that courts
may go to avoid plaintiff-favorable inferences.
One non-conclusory allegation in Moss was that only anti-Bush
protesters were moved from in front of the inn but not the supporting
counter-protesters on the west side, which plaintiffs alleged raised the
inference of viewpoint discrimination. 1 4 1 But the court said the agents'
order was to move the protesters to a point of comparable distance from
the inn as the counter-protesters were standing-one block away, on
opposite sides of the building. 4 2 The result was viewpoint neutral-all

39Id.

at 970-71.

Steinman, supra note 3 (manuscript at 20) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.
Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009)); id. (manuscript at 22 & n.19).
"'Moss, 572 F.3d at 971.
1Id.
That the anti-Bush protesters ended up much farther than one block away
was due not to the agents' orders, but the actions of local police who carried out the
move-along order and apparently went beyond it. Local police were not named in the
original complaint, although they were named in an amended complaint. Id.; see
140
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points of view an equal distance away from the President-which the
court insisted did not plausibly show a First Amendment violation.
The problem is that the complaint still alleged that anti-Bush
protesters occupied a spot on a public sidewalk lawfully because they got
there first and that they were moved. Absent some explanation for the
move, it is plausible to conclude that the (or a) reason for moving them
was the protesters' speech. By ordering only the anti-Bush speakers to
move, the agents took action against only one group. Even if the Secret
Service's goal was to place pro- and anti-Bush demonstrators equidistant
from the inn (a seemingly viewpoint neutral goal), balancing the relative
location of competing speakers is not, as a matter of law, an appropriate
government purpose when achieved by moving one point of view from a
lawfully occupied spot. This is not the only plausible conclusion, of
course, but Iqbal and Twombly do not require the plaintiffs allege the only
conclusion-only a plausible one, based on the allegations read as a
whole in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.
Second, the court insisted that the allegation that the protesters were
ordered one block away did not support the conclusion that the agents'
motivation was suppressing the anti-Bush message. The protesters still
could be heard; if the goal had been to silence the protest, agents would
have removed them from the scene entirely, or at least to a location from
which they could not be heard at all.14 3 But even if they still could be
heard, they were farther away, probably less audible, and certainly less
visible to their target audience and to anyone coming in and out of the
building. The free speech question is not only whether they could be
heard, but whether their speaking position (and theirs alone) was
4
disadvantaged or diminished-and it clearly was.1 1
Third, plaintiffs alleged that diners and guests inside the inn were
permitted to remain in close proximity to the President without security
screening. 15The
court said this allowed no inference about the agents'
motive in moving the plaintiffs; the question of whether the order was
viewpoint discriminatory only could be given meaning by reference to
the pro-Bush counter-protesters, not to non-protesting inn guests.14

But according to the non-conclusory allegations in the pleading, the
stated reason for moving the protesters away from the sidewalk in front of
the inn was to keep them out of "handgun or explosive" range of the
President. 14' That concern is belied by the pled (and accepted as true for
Rule 12(b) (6) purposes) fact that people inside the inn would have

Second Amended Complaint at 1, 3, Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., No. 06-3405-CL (D.
Or. Oct. 15, 2009) (on file with Lewis & Clark Law Review).
'
Moss, 572 F.3d at 971.
'14 TIMTHYi
ZIcK, SPEECH OUT OF Dooas: PRESERVING FIRST AMENDMENT LIBERTIES
IN PUBLIC PLACES 71-72 (2009) (emphasizing speakers' need to be within visual and
listening distance of the target audience).
'
Moss, 572 F.3d at 971.
146

id.

117

Id. at 965.
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remained within range of the President, but were not screened. In other
words, the Secret Service's stated reason was pretext, suggesting the
motivation behind the move order was something else. Combining this
with the fact that only anti-Bush protesters were moved and it certainly
seems plausible that the real, non-pretextual reason for the move was the
protesters' speech-that is, if the court properly looks at the complaint as
a coherent whole in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. That the
court ignored this inference reveals much about how courts view the task
of determining plausibility at step two-it looked for what it saw as the
more (or most) plausible explanation, not simply whether the plaintiffs'
pled explanation was, in fact, plausible.
Finally, it is notable that the court granted the plaintiffs leave to
replead.14 " The court did this in part because the action was filed in 2006,
prior to Twombly and Iqbal changing the law of pleading under the
Federal Rules.149 Granting opportunity to replead is a common remedy
for factual-insufficiency dismissals, one suggested as appropriate in Iqbal
itself' and one that we can expect to see with greater frequency. In fact,
the argument that Iqbal will impose costs at the pleading stage rests on
this likelihood. We can predict multiple rounds of complain t/motion to
dismiss/amended complaint/motion to dismiss until the plaintiff finally
crosses the plausibility threshold or the court finds further amendment
futile.'5' Of course, futility may come sooner than we expect. It is difficult
to imagine what more the Moss plaintiffs could say in an amended
pleading that will satisfy the court. It is not clear that the two conclusory
allegations, given their substance, could be redrafted in a non-conclusory
fashion; how else can a plaintiff say that the defendants acted with an
impermissible motive other than by saying so? Nor is it clear what else the
plaintiffs could say about the move-along order, given the court's
willingness to ignore plain tiff-friendly inferences and rely on its own
conclusions as to the better (and lawful) explanation for the events
described.
The result, in the end, is that a potentially significant (if monetarily
less significant 5) violation of First Amendment liberties goes
unremedied. But it goes unremedied not because consideration of the
Id. at 972.
19id.
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'5

Ahcroft v. lqbal,

129 S. Ct. 1937, 1954 (2009) (leaving to the Court of

Appeals the question of whether to remand to the District Court for plaintiff to seek
an opportu~nity to replead).
See Posting ofJonathan Siegel, supra note 130.
also sought an injunction against the alleged Secret Service policy of
5Plaintiffs
suppressing anti-President speech, although it is not clear these plaintiffs would be
able to establish standing to obtain prospective relief based on past violations of their
First Amendment liberty during a protest against a former President. See Second
Amended Complaint, supra note 142, at 3; Cf. City of L.A. v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102
(1983) ("[Plast exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself show a present case or
controversy regarding injunctive relief." (quoting O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488,
495 (1974))).
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facts on the ground as described by witnesses and documents showed no
violation. And it goes unremedied not because of judicial consideration
of the law of the First Amendment and the substantive liberty to protest
in the most advantageous position on public sidewalks. Rather, the result
is ordained by the limited information plaintiffs have or can have at the
outset of this type of case, and without an opportunity for discovery,
about the inner workings of government agencies and the inner minds of
government officials. And it is ordained by courts' new willingness to
rethink the plausibility of the plaintiffs' allegations, rather than adopting
a favorable view of the complaint taken as a coherent whole.

IV. CONCLUSION
At this stage, we only can predict where Iqbal will take federal

pleading, although commentators are not

optimistic.15

But if past is

prologue, Moss suggests that courts will be quite willing to exercise their
newfound discretion in determining plausibility and quite stingy in what
satisfies Rule 8(a) (2). The result is a disconnect between Iqbal's rigid
pleading regime and substantive constitutional and civil fights laws that
depend on looser pleading and broader discovery for proper vindication
of underlying substantive policies of exposing and deterring
governmental misconduct and of holding public officials accountable for
constitutional violations.
The result, in other words, is a judicially created mismatch between
the procedural scheme and predominant federal substantive law. The
question going forward is how lower courts, the Supreme Court,
Congress, and litigators, handle and undo the mismatch.
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See supra note 4.

